

17 November 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Briefing of Colonel Lane

1. Colonel Lane spent Tuesday, 16 November 1954, with this Staff from 0900 to 1630 hours. The schedule followed [REDACTED] in this connection is separately attached. The following paragraphs will indicate the subjects covered without detail of content, but will record in detail questions asked by Colonel Lane, any of his comments which indicated a special interest, and such further observations by this Staff as may be of use to you.

2. [REDACTED] Statement:

a. Subjects covered: Brief statement of background of [REDACTED] and covert operations responsibilities; NSCID #5, NSC 10/2, 10/5 and 5412; summary of NSC 5412 definition of covert operations; NSC and OCB sources of covert operations policy; origin, responsibilities, and structure of the [REDACTED] Staff; the CS Policy Book; CS plans, programs, projects, and reports.

b. Colonel Lane's questions or comments:

(1) Colonel Lane asked whether the CIA role is a clearly independent segment in relation to the total interest of OCB. This seemed to suggest his conclusion that the responsibility for CIA's action in prosecution of the cold war rests with DCI, which impression was confirmed by answer. The question also indicated that Colonel Lane may not understand fully the different roles of IAC and OCB. It is doubtful that [REDACTED] sufficiently covered this latter point in the course of the day.

(2) Twice Colonel Lane led a digression into the subject of war planning and war requirements in a way which indicated a strong interest in this subject. At this stage, these points were deferred to [REDACTED] presentation.

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HRP 89-2

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(3) Colonel Lane asked whether policy and planning objectives are fully compartmented, indicating as in all of his conversations a heavy interest in the subject of security. He was told that policy and planning documents are carefully compartmented, each element of the CS receiving only portions which pertain to it.

(4) He asked where he will get the picture of the supply and procurement problem and process, especially whether he would get that from [REDACTED]. He was told that [REDACTED] would be his man on this subject at the Clandestine Services level, but that the Office of Logistics is extensively involved in this subject and would have to be touched also for him to get the complete story.

(5) Colonel Lane asked who works up an individual project. He was told that the suggestion for a project may come from any source including higher executive levels or even external agencies, but that the detailed development of the project proposal itself may come from a headquarters case officer, from a field case officer, or a combination of the two.

(6) [REDACTED] made reference to statement in the last Quarterly Report that in some areas, [REDACTED] is hampered by lack of a firm U. S. foreign policy base. Colonel Lane showed sharp interest in this issue, wondering in how many areas we are so hampered and how much such lack of policy or sharp shifts in policy cause waste effort on our part. On this point, he was answered generally, not specifically. [REDACTED] mentioned the absence of any overall U. S. cold war plan. Colonel Lane expressed his previously held suspicion that such might be the case, indicated a strong belief that the U. S. should have such a plan, and wondered what U. S. agency would have the responsibility for producing it. [REDACTED] answered that this task would rest with the OCB.

(7) Colonel Lane gave the following indication of background and possible line of future interest:

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(a) That during European assignment around [REDACTED] several years ago, he had the task of inspecting military personnel on duty with other government agencies. He did not say specifically whether some of such personnel may have been with CIA, but the comment indicated the possibility that he may take a considerable interest in the problem of our use of military personnel.

(b) Colonel Lane made the comment that he is not here to find fault, and that his purpose is definitely to help, although he will make such suggestions for improvement as occur to him in the course of his observations. He indicated his impression and belief, on the basis of General Clark's conversation with the President, that the President has a very special and direct interest in the Clandestine Services and that Colonel Lane will take this impression very fully into account.

(c) He stated that he had read the Doolittle Committee report; that this report made certain recommendations concerning security, supply, and administration. However, he did not divulge any further information concerning that report. He seemed to be perfectly content with the fact that the Doolittle study had been made and gave no sign that the Doolittle exercise was a matter of any concern to him or to the Clark Committee.

3. [REDACTED] Presentation:

a. Content: By [REDACTED] War planning organization; types of war plans; war planning process; projected wartime organization. (This treatment included extensive charts and discussions on the Command Relationships Paper.) By [REDACTED] Description of EUCOM requirements for [REDACTED] assistance in wartime; brief reference to the "Agreed Activities" problem, with comment that this subject would be treated in detail in FI briefings. By [REDACTED] Description of U. S. Government plans for evacuation of personnel from combat areas in the event of war, and of CIA's problems in relation thereto.

b. Colonel Lane's questions or comments: Excluding very minor questions requiring specific clarification of items presented, Colonel Lane asked only one question involving a broad or general interest: he indicated his understanding that this presentation was many hopes with most of the accomplishments still to come; he asked when we would really have this war planning business moving. This question was met with an extensive explanation of our need for military action first, with the prediction that, if such were promptly forthcoming, we should have a good record of war planning achievement to show in a couple of years.

4. With reference to the attached schedule, Colonel Lane's afternoon hours with [redacted] and [redacted] were simply amplifications of the morning presentations by [redacted] and [redacted]. Further comment by [redacted] on his session with Colonel Lane is attached. Also, a series of observations or quoted comments noted is attached as a separate sheet. Special attention is called to Colonel Lane's revelation (with demonstration) that he can read a piece of printed or typewritten copy as readily upside down as the usual way. He indicated that, while this had been developed as a childhood exercise rather than as a professional IG tool, it had nevertheless occasionally been professionally useful.

5. It will be noted from the attached schedule that the subject of Clandestine Services reports was given only a very short time. Colonel Lane read the [redacted] summary and transmittal memorandum on the last CS Quarterly Report, and paged through the Psychological-Paramilitary Section. He was shown a memorandum recording questions asked by General Cabell about this report, the purpose of showing being this evidence of higher-level executive attention to the document. Colonel Lane expressed himself vigorously on his belief that a report is only as good as the corrective action taken on it. He was assured of our very specific recognition of this point and our intention to see that our reports are made the basis for such action. He was informed of our recognition that the commander seldom gets a completely accurate picture through reports up the command channel and that [redacted] intends, in the light of this consideration, to cooperate and cross-check closely with the observations of [redacted]. In the light of Colonel Lane's strongly expressed interest in the subject of reports, he was invited to return for further and detailed attention to this subject if he so wishes. (Prediction to him: One-half day required for this purpose.) In this connection, the point was strongly made that [redacted] is interested in seeing that adequate reporting and

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evaluation is accomplished, not in doing the job itself. He was told that, with respect to covert operations, he might receive or, upon inquiry, obtain a detailed further picture of reports and reporting in his briefing by the [REDACTED] Staff.

6. In addition to the above, Colonel Lane was shown the Monthly Activities Reports by [REDACTED] Division Chiefs on individual activities in process in this staff. He did not take time to look at [REDACTED] merely asking the size of the unit. He was asked at the end of the day whether he had any further general questions upon which he would like answer then, or to be developed, from [REDACTED] or from me. He indicated that he had no such questions, that he did not know whether he would be back for further observation of this staff, but that he might check with us from time to time as specific questions involving us might occur in the course of other briefings.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Attachments:

- A - Schedule of [REDACTED] Briefing for Colonel Lane
- B - Quotations and Observations
- C - [REDACTED] notes on conversation with Colonel Lane

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17 November 1954

Quotations and Observations of Possible Pertinence Covering
Colonel Lane's Tour of the [REDACTED] Offices the Afternoon of
16 November 1954

"I'm beginning to understand your planning basis and operation, but would like to pin down just where the cost figures enter into the picture."

"I've seen a couple of estimates the President had made by special high-power groups outside the intelligence family. I wonder to what extent they are available to you. One was headed by General Edwards; the other I can't talk about."

"I'm interest in [REDACTED] statement that there is no national cold war plan. Glad to see you are a little ahead of the game."

"How long will it take you to establish an adequate apparatus for the cold war?"

Re 1957 Plan, after ten-minute perusal - "This is a good paper!"

"Do you have a central repository for your plans? I'll get more into that sort of thing when I get to security."

Colonel Lane made repeated references to security.

He showed evidence of having done considerable research in preparation for his assignment, but was frequently confused by terminology. He was furnished with a Glossary of Intelligence Terms.

[REDACTED] stated that we do not engage in counterfeiting. . . . the statement might possibly be refuted.

Colonel Lane showed considerable experience in the field of reports. Emphasized that a report and evaluation is only as good as the remedial use of same.

He has excellent rapport with [REDACTED]

He speaks well of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

He reads print upside down as rapidly as the usual way.

He has discussed agreed activities with Mr. Dulles.

He thinks in military terms, or more precisely, in army terms.

Frequently he expressed a desire to come back.

Upon leaving, he stated that "you seem to have a fine bunch of people".

Colonel Lane is from Arkansas, prefers informality, smokes cigars, and likes a little cream and sugar in his coffee.

Colonel Lane does not like to be "fussed over". He went to the cafeteria alone, and says he can generally find his way around without help.

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178

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, PPC

SUBJECT : Notes on Conversation with Col. Herman O. Lane

1. Col. Lane stated at the beginning of period spent in War Plans Division that, at this time, he was not prepared to discuss our operation in detail; but was interested in meeting the personnel and being given a general description of our effort. Aside from the time spent in personal reminiscence, the entire period with War Plans Division was spent in the Global Plans Branch.

2. First question Col. Lane asked was: "What would happen to the organization of CIA when the first bomb was dropped?" Our reply to this was the outline of a wartime organization plan. He then asked if we sensed that the military, being dissatisfied with our acceptance of their requirements for wartime operations, were preparing to move into the clandestine field. Our reply to this was that, at the present time, they still expect CIA to be prepared to perform the assigned mission; but that if we continue to fail to accept requirements, they would no doubt develop their own clandestine support. In regard to country plans he asked if the plans would include requirements for personnel both U.S. and indigenous. We stated that it was our opinion that, as planning know how developed throughout the Agency, plans would become more detailed and eventually, we hope, would include statements as to the exact number of personnel of all types required for performance. In presenting our wartime organization, his reaction was that we had followed the general military pattern. We replied that that was true, but during wartime as a Fourth Force CIA could be more effective if the type of organization employed permitted ready coordination and cooperation with the military organization. In an aside to me, he stated that he noticed a great lack of management within the Agency, that he was not impressed by the off-repeated requirement for compartmentation which was used as an excuse for failure to coordinate actions.

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